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Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Health and Retirement Study, we provide a set
of facts about vacation leave and its relationship to hours worked, hours constraints, wage rates,
worker characteristics, spouse's vacation leave, labor market experience, job tenure, occupation,
industry, and labor market conditions. We show that on average vacation time taken rises 1 to 1 with
paid vacation but varies around it, that annual hours worked fall by about 1 full time week with every
week of paid vacation, that the gap between time taken and time paid for is higher for women, union
members, and government workers, that hourly wage rates have a strong positive relationship with
paid vacation weeks both in the cross section and across jobs, and that nonwage compensation is
positively related to vacation weeks. We provide evidence that vacation leave is determined by broad
employer policy rather than by negotiation between the worker and firm. In particular, it is strongly
related to job seniority but depends very little on labor market experience, and for job changers it is






















  Empirical research on work hours is dominated by the massive labor supply literature, which 
assumes that people can choose hours at a parametric wage.
1  However, casual empiricism suggests 
that firms have strong preferences about employee hours, and there is a good basis in theory for 
believing this to be the case.  The models of Ehrenberg (1971), Lewis (1969), Rosen (1968, 1969), 
and Deardorff and Stafford (1976) emphasize the effect of startup costs, fatigue, and hiring and 
training costs that are fixed per employee in shaping the hours preferences of firms.  They also 
consider nonlinearities in compensation that are induced by fringe benefits, payroll taxes, and 
overtime pay as well as the costs of coordinating workers who work different hours.  Rebitzer and 
Taylor (1995), Landers et al. (1996) and Sousa-Poza and Ziegler (2003) provide a different class of 
models in which firms regulate hours because hours requirements influence the quality of a firm’s 
workforce.
2   
There is also substantial evidence that the hours choices of workers are in fact constrained by 
the employer.  For example, Altonji and Paxson (1986) and recent studies by Martinez-Granado 
(2005) and Senesky (2004) show that the variances of changes in hours per week, weeks per year, 
and annual hours worked are much larger across jobs than within the job.  This evidence suggests that 
work time is to an important extent a job specific phenomenon.
3  Studies of the labor market for older 
                                                 
1 See Killingsworth (1983), Pencavel (1986) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for comprehensive surveys.  Cogan 
(1981), Hanoch (1980) and subsequent studies have modified the basic framework to accommodate fixed costs, so that 
worker preferences and budget parameters influence the form in which work hours are packaged.  Rosen (1976), Biddle 
and Zarkin (1989), and Moffitt (1984) are early examples of labor supply studies in which workers choose hours and 
wages according to a market locus. 
2 Their basic assumptions are that (1) work preferences are heterogeneous and unobserved by the firm and are either 
correlated with skill or directly influence productivity affecting current and future effort levels or turnover decisions and 
that (2) pay cannot be tied directly to the productivity of a worker.  The difficulty in matching pay to productivity may 
arise because productivity is unobservable or because of problems in devising and enforcing multi-period contracts, 
particularly when turnover is a key issue.  This will lead to reluctance on the part of highly productive workers who 
happen to have strong leisure preferences to bargain for more vacation time.  As a result, vacations will tend to be set by 
firm wide policy rather than tailored to individuals.  Too little vacation may be offered out of a fear of attracting less 
productive workers. 
3 The results of Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1992) as well as a substantial literature using self reported measures of 
unemployment, underemployment, and overemployment (eg. Ham (1982, 1986), Kahn and Lang (1992, 1995), and 
Altonji and Paxson (1988) suggest that workers face demand constraints that they cannot fully avoid by changing jobs.  
Research by Paxson and Sicherman (1996) on dual job holding suggests that second jobs are sometimes used to adjust 
hours on the margin despite the fact that they pay less per hour basis than full time jobs.  Note that we abstract from 
preferences of firms and workers regarding the timing of work over the day and the week.  See Hamermesh (1996, 1998, 
1999) for evidence.   2
workers have stressed restrictions on going part time with one’s current employer as well as a large 
wage penalty associated with giving up a full time job for part time work in another firm (e.g., 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1983, 1984), Berkovec and Stern (1991), Hurd (1996), Elder (2004) and 
Aaronson and French (2004)).
4  In summary, restrictions on choice of hours in a given job appear to 
be a key feature of the labor market.    
  Firms regulate days of work by establishing fixed holidays, paid and unpaid vacation and 
personal days (hereafter, vacation days) and provisions for excused absences due to illness or family 
considerations, perhaps with pay.  Strictly from a budget point of view, there is no meaningful 
economic distinction between “paid” and unpaid vacation.  One can always adjust the wage rate paid 
for time worked to achieve a given level of annual compensation for a given amount of time worked 
over the year.  However, adjusting time off without leaving an employment relationship involves 
authorized leave.
5  Indeed, a number of countries, particularly in Europe, regulate work time by 
requiring employers to provide a minimum number of paid vacation days.  Consequently, data on 
paid vacation days and other forms of regular leave provide a direct measure of the work 
requirements imposed on the worker by the firm or by law.  Leave policy is of interest in its own 
right and as a window on how hours are determined in the labor market.  Analyzing it may help 
inform the contentious debate over whether Americans work more than the optimal amount given 
preferences and productivity, as is implied by some of the adverse selection models of hours 
determination mentioned above.
6  Since little is known about this important job characteristic, we fill 
the gap by providing a set of facts about vacation leave and its relationship to hours worked, hours 
constraints, wage rates, worker characteristics, labor market experience and job tenure, occupation, 
industry and labor market conditions.   
Specifically, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and other sources, 
including the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to address the following questions about vacation 
leave. 
1.  What are the distributions of weeks of paid vacation received and vacation weeks 
actually taken, and how do they relate?  In particular, what is the effect of weeks of 
paid vacation on weeks actually taken? 
                                                 
4 Blank (1990a, 1990b) considers selection bias issues and concludes that there is a substantial premium to working full 
time in many but not all types of jobs.  Aaronson and French (2004) provide fairly compelling evidence for a substantial 
full time premium. 
5 Both firms and individuals also care about the daily work schedule.  See Hamermesh (1999) for analysis of the 
distribution of work hours by time of day and days of the week. 
6 See Altonji and Oldham (2003) for a brief discussion of theoretical arguments for vacation laws.  See Schor (1991), 
Kniesner (1993) and Stafford (1992) for conflicting view on trends in hours in the U.S.   3
2.  How are weeks worked per year, hours per week, hours per year on the main job, and 
annual hours on other jobs influenced by weeks of paid vacation and weeks actually 
taken?  Do workers offset vacation on the main job by working longer hours? 
3.  How are personal characteristics that influence wages and hours preference related to 
vacation time?  Is vacation time taken influenced by the amount of paid vacation time 
received by a spouse, conditional on one’s own paid vacation time? 
4.  How do hourly wage rates and weeks of paid vacation relate? 
5.  How does vacation time vary with labor market experience and seniority? 
6.  Does vacation time on a previous job influence vacation time on subsequent jobs?  We 
use this question to provide indirect evidence on the issue of whether workers 
negotiate over vacation time when taking new jobs. 
7.  How do weeks of paid vacation and weeks actually taken vary with job characteristics 
such as union membership, government employment, occupation, and industry?  Do 
they depend on percent female in an occupation?  Has the relationship between 
percent female and vacation time weakened over time?  
8.  Is vacation time countercyclical, as predicted by some equilibrium business cycle 
models? 
  The paper continues in Section 2, with a brief discussion of economic content of paid and 
unpaid vacation leave policy.  In Section 3 we discuss the data.  In Section 4 we present the empirical 
analysis.  In the conclusion we summarize the main empirical findings and provide a research agenda.  
 
2. Vacation Policy and the Worker’s Choice Set 
 
  Because there is virtually no discussion of vacation policy in the labor economics literature, 
we set the stage by discussing the implications of vacation policy for the tradeoff between earnings 
and hours that workers face.
7  Assume that days worked is the only dimension over which hours vary, 
and that people work five days a week.  Suppose the worker has preferences over consumption C and 
leisure VT, where VT = 52 – H, H is weeks worked, and VT and H are measured in 5 day work weeks.  
Let VP be paid vacation and VU be unpaid vacation, with VT = VP + VU.  The worker’s annual 
earnings E are determined by the function 
  
                                                 
7 Beam and McFadden (1998) and Maniaci (2001) discuss employee leave policies from a personnel management 
perspective.   4
E(VT; VP, VUmax, wcash, CARRY-OVER, p)  
 
where p is the worker’s weekly productivity, VUmax is the maximum amount of unpaid vacation that 
the firm will permit, wcash is the price at which a worker may cash in vacation time, and CARRY-
OVER indicates whether a worker may carry over vacation to the next year or subsequent year. 
If VT may not exceed paid leave (VUmax = 0) and unused vacation may not be carried over or 
cashed in, then the worker’s budget constraint is 
 
(2.1) E(VT; VP, VUmax = 0, wcash = 0, CARRY-OVER = no, p)  
=   0       if VT > VP 
=   p·(52–VP)      if 0 ≤ VT ≤ VP. 
 
Assuming a competitive labor market, the worker will be paid a weekly wage of p·(52–VP)/52 
throughout the year. 
There is no difference from the worker’s point of view between the above policy with VP 
equal to some value VP0 and VUmax = 0 and an alternative policy with VP = 0, VUmax = VP0, the 
requirement that the worker take unpaid leave, and a payrate of p while working. 
Below we display Table 18 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1997 Employee Benefits 
Survey (EBS), which reports the fraction of full-time workers in medium and large private 
establishments who can cash in vacation days.  Fifty-two percent of all workers who receive paid 
vacation for whom data are available can neither carry over nor cash in vacation, and so their budget 
constraint is described by (2.1).  Fourteen percent of all workers can cash in vacation days but not 
carry them over, 11 percent can either cash them in or carry them over, and 24 percent can only carry 
them over.  (The corresponding values for 1988 are 15, 5, and 25 percent, suggesting an increase in 
flexibility of vacation time.)
8 
                                                 
8 The table also shows substantial variation by occupation category.  A much larger percentage of professional and 
technical employees can carry over vacation, which is consistent with the idea that the work schedules for such workers 
may be tailored to variation over time in the needs of the firm and/or the workers.   
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Source: Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1997, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 
2517, 1999. 
 
When workers can cash in vacation weeks at the rate p·(52–VP0)/52, the budget constraint is 
 
(2.2) E(VT; VP, VUmax = 0, wcash = p, CARRY-OVER = no, p)  
=     0          i f   VT > VP 
=   p·(52–VP) + p·(VP–VT)  =  p·(52–VT)    if 0 ≤ VT ≤ VP. 
 
There is no difference from the worker’s point of view between the above policy with VP equal to 
some value VP0 and an alternative policy with no paid vacation, VUmax = VP0, and no requirement 
that the worker actually take VT = VUmax.  Annual earnings, VT, and H would be the same.  The 
hourly wage would be 52/(52–VT) higher for the worker without paid vacation when she is working 
and 0 when she is not.  (If the cash in rate is the normal weekly wage p·(52–VP0)/52 rather than 
productivity p, then the worker without paid vacation is slightly better off.) 
  Finally, consider the case in which workers may carry over VP but are not permitted to cash it 
in or to take unpaid vacation.  In this case, the earnings function is the same as (2.1), but the stock of 
vacation days available to the worker in the following year increases by VP – VT.  Many company   6
plans that allow carryover cap the amount at a certain number of days.
9  
Casual empiricism suggests that the situation is more complicated than the above three special 
cases might imply.  First, the timing of vacation schedules is often subject to the employer’s 
approval. Second, workers face a multiperiod budget constraint in which future wage rates are based 
upon past performance levels.  In some cases, workers may face an implicit trade-off between VT and 
advancement prospects even when VT is less than VP.  Third, although we do not have data on this, 
some employers require workers to take vacation time.  Finally, several human resources textbooks 
that we consulted mention that some firms offer employees the option of “buying” additional 
vacation time as part of a flexible benefits package.  (These are similar to plans in which employees 
are permitted to take some unpaid leave.)  We could not find evidence on the prevalence of such 
plans.  A major goal of the paper is to assess the degree to which rigidities in vacation policy 




We have identified two U.S. household datasets with panel data on vacation time.
10  The first 
is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID contains panel data on wage rates, weeks 
worked per year and hours worked per week on the main job, hours worked on secondary jobs, 
whether the individual could have worked more or could have worked less on the job, whether she 
would have liked to have worked more, and whether she would have liked to have worked less even 
if “you earned less money.”  It also contains information about union membership, government 
employment, industry, occupation, location, education, race, labor market experience, job seniority, 
quits, and layoffs. 
VT is based on responses to the question, “Did you take any vacation or time off during 
19XX?  How much vacation or time off did you take?”  Heads of household were asked the question 
in all years and wives were asked in 1976 and from 1979 on.  We use data for the calendar years 
1975-1991.  VP is based on responses to the question, “How many weeks of paid vacation do you get 
each year?”  The question was asked of employed heads of household in 1975-1977 and 1984 and of 
employed wives in 1976 and 1984.   
                                                 
9 For example, Yale University’s policy states, “The University encourages employees to use their vacations for rest and 
relaxation.  Consonant with that policy, employees with less than 10 years service may carry a maximum of 44 unused 
vacation days into the new fiscal year” (http://www.yale.edu/hronline/busmgr/0305/hr_e.html). 
10 In the Current Population Survey (CPS) persons who report that they were temporarily absent or on layoff “last week” 
are asked why they were absent.  “On vacation” is one of the responses.  The CPS could support an analysis of trends in 
vacation time but lacks the panel structure and rich set of covariates that are in the PSID and the HRS.     7
The measures of quits, layoffs, job seniority, and labor market experience are taken from 
Altonji and Williams (2005).  The coding of most of the other variables used in the study is 
reasonably straightforward and is summarized in Appendix A.  
  Our analysis of the effects of occupation uses information on occupational characteristics 
from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) aggregated to the three-digit Census occupation 
category.  The measure of gender composition of the occupation is the proportion of female workers 
in the worker’s three-digit Census occupational category.  The estimates below use the proportion 
female based on the 1980 Census.
11 
  We make limited use of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The sample is composed of 
persons between the ages of 51 and 61 at the start of the survey and their spouses.  The 1992, 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 waves contain questions about weeks of paid vacation, the number of 
days of paid sick leave allowed each year, and the number of days of work missed during the 
previous 12 months because of health problems.  The HRS provides data on whether the person could 
reduce hours, whether the person would like to reduce hours even if earnings were reduced 
proportionately, whether the person could increase hours, whether the person would like to increase 
hours if earnings were increased proportionately, and how many additional hours the person would 
like to work.  It also provides data on job seniority, job mobility, and fringe benefits.  The 
information is available for both the sample member and the spouse of the sample member.  The 
major disadvantages of the HRS for our purposes are the facts that it does not ask about weeks of 
vacation taken and that it covers a relatively narrow age range.  Means for the PSID and HRS of the 
main variables used in the study are in Table A1. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 The Distributions of Weeks of Paid Vacation Received and Weeks of Vacation Taken 
 
  What are the distributions of paid vacation time and unpaid vacation time?  Do people use all 
of their paid vacation time?  Is there substantial unpaid vacation time?  How do the two measures 
interrelate?  To answer these questions, we start by displaying the distributions of weeks of paid 
vacation (VP) and weeks of vacation taken (VT).  In Section 4.2 we discuss trends in vacation leave 
and in Section 4.3 we use regression methods to examine the relationship between the two vacation 
measures and work hours.  
                                                 
11 We obtain similar results when we linearly interpolate using information from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses.   8
  We focus on persons who work 35 or more hours per week on their main job, were between 
the ages of 19 and 59, had left school and not returned, had not retired, and were not self employed. 
We do not condition on weeks worked per year.  To insure that reports of vacation time over the year 
refer to persons in the same job for the entire year, we also restrict the analysis to individuals with at 
least .5 years of seniority at the time of the survey and exclude observations in a given year if the 
current job ended prior to the next interview.  Unless stated otherwise, we use these sample 
restrictions throughout the paper. 
  Figure 1 presents the distributions of paid vacation weeks (VP) and vacation weeks taken (VT) 
for men based on the years when both are available.  (The distribution of VT using 1975-1991 is 
similar, as shown in Appendix Figure A4.)  We find that 10.7 percent of the men report no paid 
weeks, 11.9 percent report 1 week, 34.3 percent report 2 weeks, 19.4 percent report 3 weeks, 14.1 
percent report 4 weeks, 6.4 percent report 5 weeks, and 3.2 percent report 6 or more weeks.  The 
distribution of VT is similar.  The distributions of VP and VT for women are similar to those for men 
(Figure 2).  However, 10.0 percent of women report 8 or more weeks of vacation taken while only 
2.1 percent report 8 or more paid weeks.   
  Figure 3 presents the distribution of VT – VP. The difference is zero for 51.7 percent of the 
men and 46.2 percent of the women.
12  For men the distribution between the values of -4 and 4 is 
skewed to the left, indicating that men are more likely to take fewer vacation weeks than they are 
paid for.  This is also true for women, although the skew is less pronounced.  Taken at face value, the 
figures suggest that in a given year many workers take less vacation or more vacation than they are 
paid for.  Part of this is probably measurement error.  Part may reflect decisions to carry over paid 
vacation across years and part may reflect occupations with a seasonal component to the work year.   
For men and women combined teachers account for only 3.4 percent of the sample but for 38.7 
percent of the cases where VT exceeds VP by more than 2 weeks. 
 
4.2 Time Trends in Weeks of Paid Vacation and Weeks of Vacation Taken 
 
We have estimated a full set of year dummies in regressions for VT that also contain the 
detailed set of control variables used in Table 3, column 4.  These consist of demographic 
characteristics, experience, seniority, union membership, government employment and industry and 
                                                 
12 In Appendix Figures A1, A2, and A3 we present the distributions of VP, VT, and VT – VP for people who work 
between 15 and 34 hours per week on their main job.  Thirty-four percent of the men and 41.2 percent of the women in 
this group report 0 for VP.  32.5 percent of the men and 21.7 percent of the women in this group report 0 for VT. It is 
unclear how part time workers interpret the question, “did you take any vacation or time off?”  
   9
occupation dummies.  The year dummies (not reported) show an inverted U-shaped pattern in which 
VT rises by about 1 day between 1975 and 1983 and then slowly returns to mid-1970s levels by the 
early 1990s.  In the PSID we do not have enough years of data to study trends in VP.  The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ the Employee Benefits Surveys (EBS) for 1982 (Table 8) and 1988 (Table 5, Table 
108) show little change in paid vacation days for full-time workers in medium and large firms when 
coverage changes in the survey are taken into account.  Between 1988 and 1993 paid vacation days 
increased by about .5 days, with the largest increase for professional and administrative employees 
(EBS 1988-Table 5; EBS 1993-Table 11).  Between 1993 and 1997 VP rose by about .2 days for 
seniority of 10 or less with a small decrease for higher seniority levels (EBS 1997-Table 13).  It is 
difficult to make comparisons after 1997, because the published tables for full-time workers are no 
longer broken down by firm size.  However, the available information suggests that any changes are 
small.  
 
 4.3 The Effect of Weeks of Paid Vacation on Weeks of Vacation Taken, Weeks Worked, and Annual 
Hours Worked 
 
The Effect of Weeks of Paid Vacation on Weeks of Vacation Taken 
  In Appendix Table A2 we report the means of VT and various measures of hours worked for a 
given value of weeks of VP.  Men who report 0 paid weeks take an average of 2.39 weeks of vacation 
taken.  Surprisingly, weeks taken fall to 1.38 for persons reporting 1 paid week.  Weeks taken then 
rise with paid weeks.  Women show the same pattern.  Weeks worked on the main job more or less 
mirror the pattern of vacation weeks taken (column 2).  The table suggests that there are some 35+ 
hours per week jobs that allow for substantial amounts of “unpaid” time off but do not provide paid 
leave.  Many of these jobs are in education---38.9 percent of K12 and college and university teachers 
report positive VT and 0 VP.  28.2 percent of the individuals in the education services industry report 
positive VT and 0 VP.  As noted in Section 4.1, some jobs with 0 paid vacation weeks may have a 
strong seasonal component to demand, such as construction work.  For seasonal jobs, the implicit 
employment contract may be structured so that vacation is taken during the off season, perhaps with a 
subsidy from the unemployment insurance system.
13   
                                                 
13 Effort by the PSID interviewer to insure that reports of vacation weeks, weeks worked on the main job, weeks lost due 
to illness, etc. sum to 52 may build in negative correlation between measurement error in VT and weeks worked.  
Consequently, one cannot directly examine the link between vacation weeks and unemployment weeks because they are 
mutually exclusive categories in the survey.  Instead, we examine the link between VT and employment status at the 
survey date.  The mean of VT is 1.28 for individuals who are unemployed at the survey date in given year, 3.12 for 
persons on temporary layoff, and 2.93 those who are employed.  A regression containing the controls in Table 1, column   10
 Regression  provides  a  clearer picture of the relationship between VP and VT.  The first row of 
Table 1 reports OLS estimates of the coefficient of the regression of VT on VP and alternative sets of 
control variables for the pooled sample of men and women.  (To reduce the influence of outlier 
observations and reporting error we recoded the approximately 1 percent of observations reporting 
more than 7 paid weeks to 7.)  The regression coefficient on VP is only .467 (.019) when we exclude 
all controls.  However, when we add a dummy 1(VP>0) for whether the worker receives paid 
vacation, the coefficient on VP rises to .799 (.023) (row 1, column 2).  The coefficient on the dummy 
1(VP > 0) is -2.80 (.110).  Part of this effect is related to the substantial difference in the nature of 
jobs that do and jobs that do not offer paid vacation.
14  When we include 1(VP > 0) and add controls 
for education, a quartic in experience, the interaction between education and experience, marital 
status, disability status, sex, race, city size, region, and calendar year, the coefficient on VP falls to 
.671 (.024).  Thus, VP has a strong influence on VT, but the effect is not 1 to 1.  The coefficient falls 
to .430 (.027) when we add controls for seniority (a cubic), union membership, and government 
employment.  Intertemporal substitution in the use of VP cannot easily explain the shortfall, because 
such substitution is likely to introduce a mean zero error into the model.  However, reporting error in 
VP could explain the shortfall. 
        We address reporting error in two ways. First, we have re-estimated the models in row 2, 
columns 1-6 using a 2 step estimator in which we first predict weeks of paid vacation using weeks of 
paid vacation in the previous year and the other variables in the model. When we control for 1(VP > 
0), the coefficient on paid weeks rises to between .979 (.052) and 1.10 (.034) depending on the 
control set used (row 2, columns 2 and 6).  Second, we exploit the fact that VP depends strongly on 
job tenure by re-estimating the models in columns 1-4 using the first 3 powers of tenure as the 
instrumental variables.  This requires the assumption that seniority does not have a direct influence 
on VT given VP.  When we control for 1(VP > 0), the coefficient on VP is .985 (.045) when all other 
controls are excluded and 1.28 (.059) when they are included (row 3, columns 2 and 4). 
  Overall, the regressions of VT on VP indicate that, on average, VT rises about one for one with 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 plus industry dummies indicates that mining and extraction, agriculture, forestry and fishing, durable goods, and 
educational services all have unusually large amounts of VT relative to VP (not reported). 
14 For men, 33.6, 12.4, and 13.6 percent of jobs with no paid vacation are in construction or agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries, or educational services (respectively), while only 3.9, 1.2 and 4.4 percent of jobs with paid vacation are in these 
industries.  Men in jobs with no paid vacation have lower tenure, are less educated, are less likely to be married, are more 
likely to be black, and are less likely to be unionized than men who receive at least a week of paid vacation.  Few women 
are in agriculture and construction, which are the source of many of the VP = 0 observations for men.  In contrast, for 
women educational services account for 42.4 percent of the jobs with no paid vacation but only 10.5 percent of the jobs 
with paid vacation.  Personal services accounts for 8.6 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively. 
   11
weeks of paid leave even though VT fluctuates around paid weeks for a given year.  We cannot rule 
out the possibility that the difference in the 2 step estimates using lagged VP with controls for tenure 
and the IV estimates using tenure as an instrument arises because variation across firms in VP has a 
weaker relationship to VT than the component of variation associated with tenure.  This might be the 
case if implicit norms about vacation time influence VT given VP and vary less than one to one with 
VP across firms. 
 
Vacation Time and Hours and Weeks Worked  
  In the top panel of Table 2, we report OLS estimates of the relationship between VT and 
various work time measures.  Each coefficient (standard error) in the table refers to a separate 
regression.  The column headings identify the dependent variable and the row headings indicate the 
controls used.  When all controls are excluded, the coefficient of VT on annual hours worked on all 
jobs is -44.3 (1.1), which indicates that an extra week of vacation is associated with about 1 less week 
of work (column 6, row 1).  The coefficient is -51.6 (1.1) when the demographic controls are added 
and -45.3 (1.2) when tenure, union membership, and government employment are added.  Almost all 
of the effect is through weeks worked on the main job.  The relationships between VT and 
hours/week and VT and annual hours on extra jobs are weak.
15  
  The second panel of Table 2 presents regressions results using VP as the vacation measure.  
(The means of the hours measures by VP level are in Table 1.)  When the demographic controls are 
included, the effect of VP on weeks worked is only .015 (.038), in sharp contrast to the coefficient of 
-1.09 (.012) using VT.  There is a similar discrepancy between the effects of VP and VT on annual 
hours worked on all jobs (column 6). 
  The discrepancy between the results for VP and VT is accounted for by the substantial positive 
difference in weeks worked between persons who receive 1 paid week and persons who receive no 
paid vacation.  When we add the dummy variable 1(VP > 0) to the model with the basic control set, 
the coefficient on VP is -.626 (.046) for weeks worked and -24.5 (4.03) for annual hours on all jobs 
(Table 2a, columns 1 and 6).  2SLS estimates of the effect of VP on weeks worked using the first 3 
powers of tenure as the excluded instruments (Table 2a, bottom) are more negative than but 
reasonably consistent with the OLS estimates of the effect of VT in Table 2 and the OLS estimates of 
                                                 
15 When we include the basic set of controls, we find that hours/week on the main job drop by .195 (.017) hours per week 
with each extra week of vacation (column 2, row 2).  This amounts to an annual reduction of about 10 hours for someone 
working 50 weeks.  However, the coefficient on VT is only -.067 (.019) when seniority, union membership, and 
government employment are controlled for.  The corresponding coefficient for annual hours on extra jobs is 3.64 (.682) 
when the basic set of controls is included and 3.17 (.735) when the full set is included.   12
the effect of VP in Table 2a, especially when sampling error is kept in mind.  Basically, an extra 
week of paid vacation is associated with a reduction in weeks worked on the main job with no offset 
or even a small reduction in the other dimensions of work hours. 
  It is interesting to compare our results for vacation time at the individual level to the country 
level analysis of Altonji and Oldham (2003).  Altonji and Oldham regress annual work hours on the 
minimum number of weeks of paid vacation and holiday required by law for a panel of several 
European countries and the U.S.  When they control for year and country, they find that an additional 
week of legislated paid vacation reduces annual hours worked by 51.9 (11.7) hours.  This estimate in 
conjunction with other estimates for alternative specifications in their paper implies that mandating 
an extra week of paid vacation translates approximately one for one into a reduction in weeks 
worked.  It suggests that the laws are binding for vacation time and that there is little or no offset 
through other dimensions of hours.   
 
4.4 Personal Characteristics and Vacation Time 
 
  In Table 3 we display the coefficients on personal characteristics in regressions for VT, VP, 
and VT – VP.  Columns 1-3 exclude controls for a cubic in tenure, union membership, and 
government employment.  Controls for labor market experience (a cubic), education times 
experience, city size, region, and calendar year are also included in the regression models (not 
reported).   
  Women take .973 (.072) more weeks of vacation than men but receive only .070 (.043) more 
paid vacation.  VP and VT are both a bit higher for married people.  Blacks receive and take about .26 
fewer weeks vacation than whites.  
Perhaps surprisingly, those with a health problem that hinders work take about .344 (.117) 
fewer weeks of vacation but receive about the same amount of paid vacation.  One might speculate 
that health problems boost sick time but reduce reported vacation time taken for a given number of 
weeks of paid vacation.  Paid sick leave might lead to a reduction in vacation time taken to recover 
from illness.
16  
                                                 
16 The HRS lacks data on vacation time taken but does report days of work missed due to health and the number of days 
of paid sick leave at full pay the individual earns each year, which we have converted to 5 day weeks.  The data are only 
obtained for persons who are with new employers or who have changed positions with an employer.  In a regression of 
weeks lost due to illness on VP, paid sick weeks, dummies for 1(VP > 0) and 1(paid sick weeks > 0), controls for 
demographic variables, seniority, union membership, and government employment, the coefficient on VP is -.050 (.031) 
and the coefficient on paid sick weeks is .214 (.032).  Thus, there is little evidence that employees use paid vacation as 
sick leave.  In a similar regression for paid sick weeks the coefficient on paid vacation weeks is .245 (.036).  This positive   13
  These basic results change only slightly when controls for seniority, union membership, and 
government employment are added in columns 4-6 of the table. 
 
Interactions between Vacation Time of Husbands and Wives 
  Is the amount of vacation married men and women take constrained by the paid vacation time 
of their spouse?  To investigate this, we regress VT on VP, VP of the spouse, indicators for (VP > 0) 
and (VP of spouse > 0) and control set 2 defined in Table 2.  The sample is restricted to couples in 
which both spouses work 35 or more hours per week.  For husbands the coefficient on VP of the wife 
is .134 (.062).  For wives the coefficient on VP of the husband is -.141 (.105), which is opposite from 
what one would expect if vacation time of husbands and wives are complements but is not 
statistically significant.
17   
We also tried replacing VP of the spouse with the function min(VP, VP of the spouse).  If 
leisure time of the husband and wife are complements, then the spouse with the least amount of paid 
vacation may constrain vacation taken by the other.  This would imply a positive coefficient on 
min(VP, VP of  spouse) when VP is also controlled for.  A substitution effect could go the other way.   
The coefficient on min(VP, VP of spouse) is .297 (.091) in the husband’s equation, but -.290 (.169) in 
the wife’s equation.    
In summary, VT is increasing in spouse’s VP for husbands and decreasing for wives.   
However, the coefficient on spouse’s VP is statistically insignificant in the case of wives, and so we 
should not make too much of the asymmetry. 
 
4.5 The Relationship between Wage Rates and Weeks of Paid Vacation 
 
  Assume that a worker is on her labor supply curve and works 50 weeks a year.  Then by the 
envelope theorem she should be willing to reduce weeks worked by one week in exchange for a 
reduction in pay of about 1/50
th, or two percent.  Alternatively, suppose the worker must choose 
between a job that offers two paid weeks of vacation with no unpaid leave permitted and a job 
offering one paid week and one unpaid week of vacation.  The worker will be indifferent between the 
two jobs if they provide the same annual compensation.  This will occur if the hourly wage rate for 
the job with two paid weeks is approximately two percent lower than the hourly wage for the job 
                                                                                                                                                                     
value is consistent with the view that the generosity levels of the various benefits that firms offer are positively correlated.  
We return to this issue in Section 4.5. 
17 The sample sizes are only 1,340 for husbands and 1,144 observations for wives in part because data on paid vacation 
for wives is only available in 1976 and 1984.  We obtain similar results when we drop the 35+ hours restriction.    14
offering only one paid week of vacation.  This prediction follows from the budget constraint.  It is 
sharper than the predictions one normally obtains from the theory of compensating differentials 
because in most applications one does know how the job attribute is valued while in the second 
example the person works fifty weeks in both jobs.
18 
On the other hand, the search theoretic models of Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998), Lang 
and Majumdar (2004), and Dey and Flinn (2005) are consistent with a positive relationship between 
vacation weeks and wages.  One possibility is that heterogeneity across firms in the value of a match 
leads some firms to adopt high wages and fringe benefits to increase offer acceptances and reduce 
turnover.  The most likely story is that the amount of vacation leave that best balances preferences of 
firms and workers is increasing in the skill level of the jobs and is positively associated with wages.   
Wages and vacation time tend to move together as job changers move up and down the job quality 
ladder as a result of random search outcomes and employer learning about worker quality.   
In Table 4 we report estimates of the effect of paid weeks of vacation on the log hourly wage 
rate.  The sample consists of men and women.  Columns 1-3 report results for the combined sample 
of hourly and salary workers.  Columns 4-6 are for hourly workers and columns 7-9 are for salary 
workers.  The model in columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 contains the linear term VP and the dummy 1(VP 
> 0).  In contrast to the simple compensating differentials story, for the hourly worker sample the 
coefficient on VP is .095 (.004), which is positive rather than negative (column 4).  The coefficient on 
VP declines to .077 (.005) when demographic controls, seniority, union membership, and government 
employment are all controlled for.  Results for the combined sample and for the salaried sample are 
similar.   
  Note, however, that the coefficient on 1(VP > 0) is large and negative for the combined 
sample and for hourly workers, although it is positive for salary workers.  Columns 3, 6, and 9 report 
estimates of a model containing dummy variables for each vacation category, with VP = 2 as the 
reference category.  As one can see, the move from 0 to 1 week is associated with a decrease in 
wages in all three samples, as predicted by the theory of compensating differentials, but the decrease 
                                                 
18 If workers are over employed at the standard level of vacation weeks, as some proponents of minimum vacation laws 
argue, the compensating differential for giving up a week of paid leave and working should be even larger than 1/50.  To 
see this, assume that workers are not hours constrained at a job offering the wage rate w(VP
*) and VP
* paid weeks of 
vacation.  Let w(VP
**) for some VP
** < VP
* be the wage rate at which the individual is indifferent between working 52 – 
VP
* weeks and receiving 52·w(VP
*) and working 52 – VP
** weeks for 52·w(VP
**).  Following along the lines of Abowd 
and Ashenfelter’s (1981) analysis of hours constraints, one may show that 
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where e is the compensated labor elasticity.  If e is .2 and VP
* is 5, then w(2) should exceed w(5) by about 6.7 percent of 
the w(5) wage.  If VP
* = 5, w(2) should exceed w(3) by about 2.3 percent of the w(2) wage.      15
is unreasonably large for hourly and salary workers combined and for hourly workers.  After that, 
wages rise substantially with additional weeks through the 5
th week.  We have already documented 
that the occupation and industry distribution of jobs with VP = 0 differs substantially from that of 
jobs which offer paid vacation.  We have also shown that VT is higher and annual weeks worked is 
lower in jobs with VP = 0. 
  Appendix Table A3 reports similar results for the HRS.  For example, for hourly workers the 
coefficients on VP and 1(VP > 0) are .062 (.004) and -.061 (.015) in the specification corresponding 
to column 5 of Table 4.    
Presumably, the positive wage coefficient in the HRS and the PSID reflects bias from 
unobserved skills of the worker and/or characteristics of the job that influence wages and paid 
vacation in the same direction. Such bias in wage level regressions is widely discussed in the 
compensating differentials literature. Adding two-digit occupation controls and two-digit industry 
controls reduces the coefficient on 1(VP > 0) by about half but has little effect on the VP coefficient.    
A number of papers have used job changes to examine the link between wages and job 
characteristics, including early papers Brown (1980) and Duncan and Holmlund (1983) and recent 
papers by Usui (2004) and Villanueva (2004).  The HRS sample is sufficient to permit estimation of 
wage change regressions of the form 
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where ∆ is the first difference operator across time, Wit is the log wage, Qit is 1 if the person changed 
jobs between surveys due to a quit and Lit is 1 if the person changed jobs due to a layoff, OCCit is a 
vector of occupation dummies, and Zit consists of a cubic in tenure, a quartic in experience, education 
times experience, health limitation dummies, and dummies for marital status, union membership, 
government employment, region, and year.  We restrict the sample to job changers who were less 
than 60, had not retired, and worked more than 35 hours per week in both the current and previous 
survey years.   
The estimates are reported in Table 5.  Column 4 refers to the combined sample of hourly and 
salary workers. The estimate of a2 is .038 (.010) and the estimate of a4 is .046 (.014).  The positive 
coefficients cannot be easily be attributed to bias from unobserved variation in worker skill and are 
also hard to square with a simple story about bias due heterogeneity in wage offers across job 
matches for a given value of VP.   
The positive association between wages and VP is mirrored in the relationship between VP   16
and fringe benefits.  Using fringe benefits data from the 1984 wave of the PSID, we obtain substantial 
positive coefficients when we regress dummies for whether the employer provides health insurance, 
paid sick days, dental benefits, life insurance, and a pension plan on VP and the full set of controls 
(not shown).  In the HRS we also find a strong positive association between VP and presence of a 
pension plan.  We have also used the HRS to study the relationship between changes in benefits and 
changes in VP following a quit or a layoff using a regression specification analogous to column 3 of 
Table 5.  For both quits and layoffs the change in the probability of having a pension plan is 
positively related to the change in the number of weeks of VP.  The change in the probability that the 
worker gets sick leave is also a positive function of VP in the case of quits. 
In summary, we find that the wage and other job benefits vary positively with VP.    
 
4.6 Hours Constraints and Vacation Time 
 
  We use a series of questions in the PSID about whether the individual would like to reduce 
hours “even if it meant less money” and whether the individual could have worked less if she wanted 
to to construct an overemployment indicator. We also used a parallel set of questions to construct a 
measure of underemployment.  Precise estimates from separate probit models with controls for 
demographic characteristics, job seniority, union membership, government employment and 1(VP > 
0) show that the effect of VT and VP on the probability of reporting overemployment is essentially 
zero.  Using similar questions in the HRS we find that one week of paid vacation raises the 
probability of overemployment by .006 (.003).  In both the PSID and the HRS the probability of 
reporting underemployment falls with VT and with VP.  In the PSID an extra week of VP is 
associated with a reduction of .022 (.005) in the probability of reporting underemployment, which 
compares to the mean probability of .268.  Consequently, we have no evidence suggesting that 
vacation time alleviates overemployment or exacerbates underemployment, in contrast to what 
popular discussion of the “overworked American” might lead one to expect.
19  
 
4.7 The Effects of Experience, Seniority and Job Mobility on Vacation Time 
 
In this section we measure the effects of experience and seniority on VP and VT, establish that 
vacation time is largely a function of tenure rather than labor market experience, and provide 
suggestive evidence that vacation time reflects broad firm policy rather than the preferences and 
                                                 
19 In the PSID we obtain similar results for women with children under 12. 
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bargaining power of individual workers. 
 
OLS and Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Experience and Tenure Profiles 
In Table 6 we present estimates of the effects of labor market experience and tenure on VT, 
VP, and VT – VP.  The estimates are based on regression models that a cubic in tenure, a quartic in 
experience, the interaction between experience and education, and a set of control variables.  We 
estimate separate models for men and women.  
Column 1 presents OLS estimates of the effects of 2, 5, 10, and 20 years of tenure and 5, 10, 
20, and 30 years of experience prior to the start of the job.  The results show that VT rises by .258 
(.019) over the first two years on the job, 1.14 (.048) over the first 10 years, and 2.00 (.044) over the 
first 20 years.  The relationship between VT and experience is flat.
20  Column 2 uses Altonji and 
Shakotko’s (1987) instrumental variables strategy to deal with the possibility that tenure is correlated 
with unobserved person specific and job specific heterogeneity that also influences VT.  The 
estimated effects of seniority on VT are about one third less than the OLS estimates, and the estimates 
of the effects of experience are close to zero.   
The second panel of the table reports estimates for VT for the sample used to study VP.  The 
estimates of the effect of seniority are very similar to estimates for the full set of years, although the 
standard errors are much larger in the IV case.   
The third panel reports estimates of the effects of tenure and experience on VP.  The OLS 
estimates and the IV estimates are very similar for both men and women through ten years of 
seniority.  The IV estimates actually lie above the OLS estimates at 20 years, although the IV 
estimates are very noisy and the difference is not statistically significant.  In general, the choice 
between the OLS and the IV estimator makes much less difference for vacation time than for wages.  
Paid vacation time varies very little with experience.  Both the OLS and the IV estimates imply that 
for men paid vacation rises more rapidly with tenure and than weeks of vacation taken.  The point 
estimates suggest the opposite for women, although standard errors are large for both groups, 
especially in the IV case for women. 
  Table 7 reproduces a table from the 1997 EBS that reports average paid holidays and paid 
vacation and average paid sick leave for full-time employees in medium and large private 
establishments by tenure.  The table implies that vacation days increase by an average of about one 
                                                 
20 Simple crosstabs of VP by experience and seniority in the previous year for full-time men also indicate that VP and VT 
rise by about 2 weeks over the first 15 years on the job and that VP has little to do with experience conditional on tenure 
(not shown).   18
half days per year over the first 20 years and very little after that.
21  One cannot tell from the Table 7 
how uniform the policies are within the many firms, but the EBS is very consistent with the PSID 
based estimates of the tenure profile of VP. 
 
The Link between Vacation Weeks Across Jobs 
  If vacation time can be bargained over, then workers who had long vacations on their 
previous job will use this as a bargaining chip for more vacation time on the new job in much the 
same way that wage rates on a previous job influence reservation wages for any new job.  
Furthermore, if the amount of paid and unpaid leave is to some extent at the discretion of employees, 
then those who chose relatively long vacations on a previous job are likely to choose long vacations 
on the new job.  On the other hand, if vacation time is set by rigid firm wide policy, then prior 
vacation time will have little influence on the vacation in the new job, other than through job 
selection.   
In Table 8 we report the coefficient of the regression of VT on current job on the average of 
VT during the last two years of the previous job and a full set of controls, including current seniority 
and experience at the start of the job.
22  We average VT to reduce the effects of reporting error and 
random variation in when vacation on the previous job is taken.  The coefficient on past VT is .216 
(.056).  Measurement error in the two-year averages probably biases these estimates downward, 
while fixed heterogeneity across workers in leisure preferences or in the prevailing vacation packages 
in particular occupations and industries biases them upward.  When we add dummies for the current 
two-digit occupation, the coefficient falls to .094 (.057).  When we restrict the sample to cases in 
which the previous job ended due to a quit, we obtain the estimates of .282 (.072) or .150 (.078) 
depending on whether or not we control for occupation (columns 4 and 5).  The results for layoffs are 
.291 (.088) with occupation controls excluded and .176 (.090) with occupation controls included.   
  Table 9 reports similar regressions using VP.  Because VP is only available for the years 
1975-1977 and 1984, the sample size of job changers is small.  When we use VP in the last year of 
the previous job rather than the average of the values for the last two years, we obtain a coefficient of 
.121 (.058) when occupation controls are excluded and only .010 (.058) when occupation controls are 
included.  These coefficients rise to .338 (.093) and .251 (.106), respectively, when we use two year 
averages, although the sample size is only 158.    
                                                 
21 Buckley (1989) presents summary tables on paid vacation time using the Employee Benefits Survey for 1983-1986.   
The CPS does not appear to have ever collected information about vacation weeks.  
22 We continue to drop an observation if tenure at the survey date is less than .5 or if it is the last observation on the job.   19
Taken at face value, the results suggest that prior vacation has only a small effect on vacation 
on the new job once occupation is controlled for.  Some relationship would be expected to arise 
through the effect of vacation time in the old job on the reservation locus of job characteristics to 
induce a job change.  It is fully consistent with the fact that tenure on the previous job has little to do 
with vacation time on the new job.
23   Evidently, people who had a lot of vacation on their old job are 
unable or unwilling to bargain for a similar vacation on the new job.  To a large degree, vacation 
policy is set firm wide. 
  To put the results in perspective, the middle panel of Table 8 reports regressions of hours per 
week on the current job on the average of hours per week in the last two years on the previous job. 
The coefficient is .312 (.028) when occupation is not controlled for and .263 (.031) when occupation 
is controlled for.  These coefficients are larger than the corresponding values for vacation time, but 
suggest that work hours are heavily influenced by the specific job and not easily amenable to 
bargaining.  In contrast, the bottom panel presents regressions of the log of the hourly wage rate in 
the current job on the average for the last two years on the previous job.  The coefficients are .682 
(.028) without occupation controls and .668 (.028) with occupation controls.  Part of the difference 
probably reflects a more important role for fixed individual heterogeneity in the determination of 
wage rates than in the preferences for hours.  That is, even if people are perfectly free to choose hours 
per week and vacation time, there might be less heterogeneity in these variables than in the 
productivity factors underlying wage rates.  Overall, the results suggest, in common with other 
evidence regarding work hours mentioned in the Introduction, that vacation time as well as work 
hours are governed by broad policies of the employer.  They are not heavily influenced by the 
preferences or alternative opportunities of a particular worker.  
 
4.8 The Effects of Union Membership, Government Employment, Industry and Occupation 
Characteristic, and Gender on Vacation Time 
 
The above analysis suggests that vacation time reflects employer policy.  We now examine 
variation in vacation time across job types.  Conditional on demographic characteristics and 
experience and tenure, union membership boosts VT by .487 (.067) weeks and VP by only .183 (.037) 
                                                 
23 For a sample of job changers, a tabulation of weeks taken (VT) on the new job by experience and tenure on the previous 
job shows little systematic variation with either experience or prior tenure (not shown).  This is true for both quits and 
layoffs considered separately. These results indicate that seniority-based vacation is usually lost when a person changes 
employers.  They reinforce our finding of a relatively weak link between vacation on the previous job and the current job 
controlling for seniority on the current job.  They suggest that employees are unable or unwilling to negotiate vacation on 
the new job on the basis of vacation on the previous one. 
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weeks.  Government workers take 1.20 (.065) more weeks of vacation per year and receive .681 
(.038) more paid weeks (Table 3, columns 4 and 5).  Perhaps unions and civil service structures 
suppress “rat races” and so reduce the incentive of employees to forgo paid vacation.  Another 
potential explanation for government workers is that “comp” time is more prevalent in the public 
sector and that “comp” time is taken as additional vacation but is not reported as paid vacation. We 
do not have any evidence on this at this point. 
  Table 10 presents estimates of the effects of occupation on VT, VP and VT – VP when 
demographic characteristics, seniority, union membership, and government membership are 
controlled for.  The reference occupation is “Operatives, Except Transport.”  For VT we report 
estimates using the sample for 1975-1991.  The largest coefficient in the VP equation is 2.42 (.138), 
which is for armed forces.  Interestingly, for that group the coefficient on VT is only .426 (.099).  In 
general, one obtains positive coefficients for VP in professional occupations.  The two largest 




Vacation Policy and Hours Preferences of the Median Worker: The Effect of Percent Female in 
Occupation on Vacation Time 
 
Rosen (1969) and Deardorff and Stafford’s (1976) analyses suggest that job characteristics 
will be determined in part by the preferences of the typical worker in a job.  Women work fewer 
hours than men even among full-time workers.  Usui (2004) shows that for both men and women 
average annual hours worked is negatively related to the proportion female in an occupation.  In the 
PSID vacation time is positively related to the proportion female in an occupation.  Did the large 
changes over the past 3 decades in the gender composition of the workforce and the sharp increase in 
women’s work hours weaken the relationship?  The coefficient on percent female in an occupation is 
.482 (.134) for men and 1.28 (.290) for women for the years 1975-1983 in regressions that controls 
for demographic characteristics, seniority, union membership, government employment, a detailed 
list of occupational characteristics based upon the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and a dummy 
                                                 
24  We also regressed VP on characteristics drawn from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, entering characteristics one 
at a time in regressions with our full set of control variables (not shown).  Measures of general education development - 
math, language, reason, and specific vocational preparation (SVP) all enter positively and are highly significant.  
Measures of strength, climbing, stooping, balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling, reaching, handling, fingering, feeling, 
talking, hearing, tasting/smelling, near acuity, far acuity, depth perception, accommodation, color vision and field of 
vision are negative in most cases.  Proxies for bad environmental conditions typically enter negatively and are statistically 
significant in some cases.   
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for whether the person is a teacher.  For the period 1983-1991, the coefficient is .247 (.124) for men 
and .589 (.198) for women.  One hypothesis is that the decline in coefficients is the result of a 
decrease in the desired number of weeks of vacation among women between the two periods, as the 
labor force attachment of women has increased.  Unfortunately, we cannot examine changes in the 
link between VP and percent female over the same period.   
 
4.9 Implicit Contracts, Intertemporal Substitution over the Business Cycle and Vacation Time 
 
  To the extent that leisure is substitutable over time at annual frequencies, one might expect VT 
– VP to be countercyclical.  It is efficient for workers to shift VT from booms to periods when 
business is slow.  Research on intertemporal substitution over the business cycle has generally failed 
to explain movements in hours as a response on the labor supply curve to procyclical movements in 
wage rates.  However, Barro (1977) and others have argued that hours per week and annual weeks 
worked are governed by implicit contracts in which hours decisions respond to an unobservable 
shadow price of labor that equates marginal revenue production with the marginal utility of leisure 
rather than to the contractual wage, which reflects marginal revenue product over a longer horizon.  
Such models are difficult to assess, however, because the shadow price is not observed.  An 
examination of VT relative to VP provides a window on this possibility.  Under such an implicit 
contract the timing of vacations would respond to the needs of the firm as well as the needs of the 
worker.  Under the reasonable assumption that firms do not change paid vacation policy in response 
to short-term business conditions, cyclical variation in VT – VP would be similar to variation in VT, 
ignoring compositional changes in the job mix and work force over the business cycle.   
We examine this issue by regressing VT on state level business cycle indicators for 1975-
1991.  The indicators consist of the state unemployment rate and the change in the state 
unemployment rate.  We control for individual fixed effects to guard against spurious correlation 
between the labor market indicators and unobserved compositional changes in the workforce that 
influence vacation time, as well as for education, experience, job seniority, union membership, 
government employment, marital status, disability status, city size, region, and a quadratic time trend.  
Standard errors account for clustering at the state year level.  In separate regressions we obtain a 
coefficient of .013 (.007) when we use the state unemployment rate as our business cycle indicator 
and a coefficient of .025 (.008) when we use the change in the state unemployment rate.  The results 
suggest that vacation time is in fact weakly countercyclical, as predicted by models of intertemporal 
substitution.  In summary, we have a little evidence that firms and workers adjust weeks worked   22
through the timing of vacations in response to changes in demand, but the magnitudes are small.
25  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Once one steps beyond the standard labor supply model of hours determination in which 
workers are free to choose how much to work at a parametric wage, the study of work hours becomes 
very complicated.  Vacation policy is a key component of the regulation of work hours and is an 
important job attribute, but has been the subject of very little research.  Using the PSID and the HRS, 
we have provided the first detailed analysis of paid vacation time and vacation time actually taken.  
Our main findings are as follows. 
1.  There is substantial variation in both VP and VT.  An increase in VP leads to an 
increase of one week in VT, but there is a significant amount of variation in VT around 
VP.  There is little evidence that an extra week of VP is offset by increases in other 
dimensions of work hours, such as hours per week or annual hours on other jobs.  An 
extra week of VP reduces annual hours worked by approximately one week.   
 
2.  Women take about one more week of vacation than men, but receive only slightly 
more paid vacation.  Part of the gender difference in VT – VP is related to the high 
concentration of women in education and related field.  VP and VT are both a bit 
higher for married people and about .26 weeks lower for blacks.  There is weak 
evidence that married men take more vacation if their spouses have more paid 
vacation, holding their own VP constant, while married women take less vacation if 
their spouses have more paid vacation. 
 
3.  Hourly wage rates as well as our broad array of fringe benefits are positively related to 
VP both in the cross-section and across jobs.   
 
4.  Both VP and VT increase with seniority but are largely unrelated to labor market 
experience (conditional on seniority).  For job changers vacation time on previous job 
has little relationship with vacation time on the new job.  Our results suggest that 
vacation time is determined by firm wide policy and tends not to reflect the 
preferences and bargaining power of individual employees.  Coordination costs do not 
provide a full explanation for the lack of heterogeneity, because within a firm vacation 
time varies with seniority.  As noted in the introduction, a possible explanation is that 
correlation between hours preferences and unobserved factors that influence 
productivity and turnover may make workers reluctant to bargain.   
 
5.  Both VT and VP are higher for union members and government workers.  VT and VP 
vary substantially across occupations and industries.  VT is positively associated with 
percent female in an occupation controlling for the gender of the worker and other 
characteristics.  The relationship between percent female and VT has declined 
                                                 
25 If consumers are credit constrained, then complimentarity between market goods (travel fares, lodging, etc.) and time in 
the production of vacations is an offsetting force that could lead to procyclical variation in vacation time taken.   23
substantially over time, which is consistent with models in which the hours policy of 
the firm reflects the typical worker, and the work preferences of women and men have 
converged to some extent.  
 
6.  Vacation time taken is countercyclical, as predicted by some equilibrium business 
cycle models, but the relationship is weak. 
 
A natural program for future research is the development and empirical testing of alternative models 
of the role of firms in determining work hours mentioned in the Introduction, with particular attention 
to leave policy.   24
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Appendix A: Description of Variables Used 
 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
Employment Variables: 
1.  Paid vacation (VP) is asked in 1975-1977, and 1984 for the heads and 1976 and 1984 for the 
wives. In 1975-1977, respondent is asked “How many weeks of paid vacation do you get each 
year?”  In 1984, respondents who answered to “yes” to “Not counting holidays like Christmas 
and Labor Day, do you get paid vacation or personal days?” were asked “How much paid 
vacation or personal time do you get each year?”  In 1984, respondents reported VP either in days 
per year, weeks per year, hours per year, or other (combination).  We converted days per year and 
hours per year to 5 day weeks assuming 8 hours per day and rounded to the nearest integer.  
2.  Vacation taken (VT): Respondents who answered “yes” to “Did you take any vacation or time off 
during 19XX?” were asked “How much vacation or time off did you take?” 
3.  Indicators for quits and layoffs, job seniority and labor market experience are taken from Altonji 
and Williams (2005). 
4.  Hourly rate of pay: To reduce the influence of measurement error and outliers, wage rates are set 
to missing when they are less than $1.5.  
5.  Industry and Occupation: Coded based on three digit 1970 Census codes.  
6.  0-1 indicators for union membership and government employment. 
7.  Hours Constraints: We construct the variables for overemployment and underemployment 
following Altonji and Paxson (1988, page 263, fn 7). 
 
Demographic Variables: 
1.  Marital status: 0-1 indicator for married with spouse present and never married, divorced, 
separated, or deceased. 
2.  Race: Separate 0-1 indicators for black and nonwhite/nonblack.  The excluded category in the 
regressions is white.  
3.  Education: 1-16 (fourth year college), 17 (at least some graduate work). 
4.  Health limitation: 0-1 indicator for whether the respondent has physical or nervous condition that 
limits the type of work or the amount of work. 
5.  Region and urbanicity of current residence: We include separate 0-1 indicators for northeast, 
north central, and west. The excluded category is south.  Our urbanicity measures are a 0-1 
indicator for whether the residence is in SMSA and a 0-1 indicator for whether the residence is in 




The Health and Retirement Study  
Information on age, gender, race, census region, education, current marital status, whether health 
limits work, labor force status, hours of work per week at current job, the wage rate, job seniority and 
labor market experience are taken from files produced by RAND Corporation. 
 
Employment Variables: 
1.  Paid vacation (VP): Response to “How many weeks of paid vacation do you get each year?” 
2.  0-1 indicators for quits and layoffs: The respondent was asked “Why did you leave that 
employer?”  If the respondent reported either business closed or laid off/let go, then the 
separation is coded as layoff.  If the respondent reported poor health/disabled, family care, better 
job, quit, family moved, divorce/separation, transportation, too much travel, and/or transferred, 
then the separation is coded as a quit.  The respondent was allowed to report more than one   29
reason for leaving the employer. If the reasons given fall into both the quit and layoff categories 
we treated the separation as a quit. 
3.  Hourly rate of pay: Wage information is available for respondent who were working at the time 
of the interview.  Wages are deflated to 1982-84 dollars using the CPI-U.  To reduce the influence 
of measurement error and outliers, wage rates are set to missing when they are less than $1.5.  For 
wage change specifications wages that are more than 800% or less than 1/8
th of the previous 
year’s value are dropped as well. 
4.  0-1 indicators for union membership and government employment. 
5.  Industry and Occupation: Industry is classified into 13 categories.  Occupation is classified into 
17 fields.  
6.  Hours Constraints: We construct the variable for overemployment and underemployment 
following Altonji and Paxson (1988, page 263, fn 7).  
 
Demographic Variables: 
1.  Marital status: 0-1 indicator for married/married spouse absent/partnered and 
separated/divorced/widowed/never married. 
2.  Race: Separate 0-1 indicators for black and nonwhite/nonblack.  The excluded category is white. 
3.  Education: 0-16 (fourth year college), 17 (at least some graduate work). 
4.  Health limitation: 0-1 indicator for whether an impairment or health problem that limits the kind 
or amount of paid work for the respondent.  
5.  Region of current residence: Separate 0-1 indicators for northeast, midwest, and west.  The 
excluded category is south. 
 
Proportion Female in an Occupation 
Proportion female in an occupation is computed from the three digit occupation code in the Public 
Use Microdata 5-Percent Samples of the 1980 and 1990 US Censuses of Population.  We match the 
proportion female to individuals on the basis of their recorded occupation in two ways.  The first is to 
assign proportion female of an occupation to the worker’s reported occupation using the 1980 
Census.  The second is to use a linear interpolation using the proportion female based on the 1980 
and 1990 Censuses and the year of the survey. 
 
Occupational Characteristics 
The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) has the following information on occupational 
characteristics.  General education development, which is measured by reasoning, math, language, 
and specific vocational preparation (SVP).  Aptitudes are in 11 fields: general learning, verbal, 
numerical, spatial, form perception, clerical perception, motor coordination, finger dexterity, manual 
dexterity, eye-hand coordination, and color discrimination.  Physical demands are in 20 fields: 
strength, climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, reaching, handling, fingering, 
feeling, talking, hearing, tasting/smelling, near acuity, far acuity, depth perception, accommodation, 
color vision, and field of vision.  Environmental conditions are in 14 fields: weather, cold, hot, 
wet/humid, noise, vibration, atmospheric condition, move mechanic parts, electric shock, high exp. 
places, radiation, explosives, toxic caustic chemicals, and other environmental conditions.  Notes: The sample contains individuals who work 35 or more hours per week in their main job, 
were between age 19 to 59, had left school and not returned, had not retired, and were not self-
employed. It also restricts to persons who have at least .5 years of seniority at the time of the 
survey and exclude observations if the job ended prior to the next interview.
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Weeks of Paid Vacation (VP)
Weeks of Vacation Taken (VT)Estimation Method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.467 0.799 0.329 0.671 0.105 0.430
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027)
-2.800 -2.623 -2.153
(0.110) (0.108) (0.109)
0.521 1.098 0.358 1.037 0.100 0.979
(0.024) (0.034) (0.028) (0.040) (0.034) (0.052)
-3.153 -3.138 -3.023
(0.156) (0.157) (0.173)
0.846 0.985 1.067 1.278





The Effect of Vacation Weeks Paid on Vacation Weeks Taken 
Control Variables
VP
Add Tenure, Union 
and Government
None Add Demographic 
Variables
When 1(VPt > 0) is included as a control in the two step estimation (columns 2, 4, and 6), the regression in the first step 
controls for 1(VPt > 0) and 1(VPt-1 > 0). The sample size for the OLS and IV estimates is 10,752. The sample sizes for the 
two step estimates are 3,795 in the first step and 8,821 (3,788) in the second step when  1(VPt > 0) is (not) controlled for. 
The sample contains individuals who work 35 or more hours per week in their main job, were between age 19 to 59, had 
left school and not returned, had not retired, and were not self-employed. It also restricts to persons who have at least .5 
years of seniority at the time of the survey and exclude observations if the job ended prior to the next interview. Standard 





Notes: The top panel reports OLS estimates. The second panel uses a two step estimator in which weeks of paid vacation 
are predicted using weeks of paid vacation in the previous year and the other controls in the model. The third panel uses 
an IV estimator with a cubic in tenure as the excluded instrumental variables. The column headings identify the controls. 
Column 1 includes only an intercept. Column 2 includes an intercept and an indicator equal to 1 if a worker receives paid 
vacation. Column 3 includes a set of demographic characteristics: education, experience (a quartic and an interaction 
between education and experience), dummies for sex, marital status, residence in SMSA, residence in city more than 
500,000 people, and disability status, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. Column 4 adds 
the indicator for VP > 0. Column 5 includes a set of demographic characteritics, tenure (a cubic), and dummies for union 
membership and government employment. Column 6 adds the indicator for  VP > 0.
IV, tenure used as 
Instruments























Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-1.029 -0.084 -0.588 -54.451 3.992 -44.259
(0.012) (0.017) (0.327) (1.200) (0.633) (1.098)
-1.088 -0.195 0.697 -60.037 3.644 -51.617
(0.012) (0.017) (0.353) (1.231) (0.682) (1.131)
-1.047 -0.067 -0.055 -52.670 3.166 -45.309
(0.013) (0.019) (0.380) (1.316) (0.735) (1.214)
N 55506 55611 30157 33727 33727 55611
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.054 -0.004 2.397 9.866 -1.277 0.396
(0.035) (0.048) (1.218) (4.682) (2.386) (3.162)
0.015 -0.116 3.045 9.397 -4.458 -7.031
(0.038) (0.051) (1.298) (4.747) (2.532) (3.299)
0.273 -0.048 3.013 29.168 -6.549 8.789
(0.042) (0.055) (1.416) (5.072) (2.759) (3.632)
N 10761 10769 3500 3500 3500 10769
Vacation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.626 -0.011 1.881 -4.309 2.471 -24.542
(0.046) (0.061) (1.588) (5.796) (3.093) (4.026)
4.918 -1.472 9.766 115.147 -58.120 134.793
(0.202) (0.270) (7.683) (28.038) (14.961) (17.795)
N 10761 10769 3500 3500 3500 10769
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-1.095 -0.298 -0.351 -79.573 -2.375 -60.769
(0.108) (0.143) (3.962) (14.800) (7.716) (9.479)
6.115 -0.741 15.988 324.983 -44.610 227.065
(0.321) (0.426) (12.707) (47.467) (24.746) (28.214)
N 10761 10769 3500 3500 3500 10769
The Effect of Vacation Weeks Taken and Weeks of Paid Vacation on Hours Measures
The Effect of Weeks of Paid Vacation on Hours Measures
Paid Vacation (VP)
1(VP > 0) 
1(VP > 0) 
IV using Tenure, Tenure
2, and Tenure
3 as Excluded Instruments: Regression 
Coefficient (Standard Error)
Paid Vacation (VP)
3. Add Tenure, Union and 
Government
Table 2a
OLS: Regression Coefficient (Standard Error)
Controls: Demographic Variables
Notes: Each Panel of Table 2 reports three specifications. The first specification includes only an intercept. The second 
specification contains a set of demographic characteristics. These consist of education, experience (a cubic and an interaction 
between education and experience), dummies for sex, marital status, residence in SMSA, residence in city more than 500,000 
people, and disability status, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. The third specification adds 
seniority (a cubic) and dummies for union membership and government employment. The top panel of Table 2a reports OLS 
estimates of the effects of paid vacation and an indicator equal to 1 if paid vacation is greater than zero. The equations include 
the demographic controls used in specification 2 of Table 2. The bottom panel of Table 2a reports IV estimates, with weeks of 
paid vacation treated as endogenous and the 1(VP > 0) treated as exogenous and the tenure variables as the excluded 
instruments. We have fewer observations for columns 3-5 because only observations from year 1984 are available.
Effect of Vacation Weeks Taken (VT) on Hours Measures
Table 2
1. None
2. Add Demographic 
Variables
3. Add Tenure, Union and 
Government
Effect of Weeks of Paid Vacation (VP) on Hours Measures
1. None














Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.973 0.070 0.902 1.043 0.123 0.920
(0.072) (0.043) (0.076) (0.071) (0.041) (0.077)
0.494 0.193 0.301 0.454 0.175 0.279
(0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023) (0.013) (0.025)
0.276 0.066 0.209 0.223 0.019 0.204
(0.077) (0.046) (0.081) (0.074) (0.043) (0.081)
-0.344 -0.019 -0.325 -0.366 -0.030 -0.336
(0.117) (0.070) (0.123) (0.112) (0.065) (0.123)
-0.154 -0.185 0.031 -0.300 -0.255 -0.045
(0.071) (0.043) (0.075) (0.069) (0.040) (0.076)
-0.188 -0.415 0.226 -0.084 -0.320 0.236
(0.195) (0.116) (0.205) (0.188) (0.109) (0.205)
-0.009 0.257 -0.266 -0.067 0.199 -0.266





Control for Tenure No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.108 0.126 0.042 0.175 0.238 0.049
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752
Union Membership
Government Employment
Notes: All models control for experience (a cubic and an interaction between education and experience), dummy variables for 
residence in SMSA, residence in a city with more than 500,000 people, 3 regions, and 3 calendar year. Columns 4-6 also include 
tenure (a cubic), dummies for union membership and government employment. The sample selection criteria are described in the 
note to table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Disability Status
Black







Personal Characteristics and Vacation Time(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.068 0.054 0.095 0.077 0.038 0.027
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
-0.061 -0.049 -0.138 -0.134 0.088 0.111















Controls for tenure, 
union and 
government
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.492 0.517 0.526 0.456 0.510 0.512 0.501 0.523 0.540
N 9500 9500 9500 5732 5732 5732 3768 3768 3768
Table 4
The Effect of Weeks of Paid Vacation on the Log of the Hourly Wage
Sample





Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients relating log hourly wage rate to measures of weeks of paid vacation. The 
wage measure is based on direct questions about rate of pay and refers to the main job at the time of the survey. In columns 
1,2,4,5,7, and 8 the vacation variables are the number of weeks (VP and and indicator for VP > 0. Columns 3, 6, and 9 contain 
dummy variables for each number of weeks of paid vacation with VP=2 as the reference category. All models include education, 
a cubic in experience, education * experience, dummies for sex, marital status, residence in SMSA, residence in city more than 
500,000 people, and disability status, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. Column 2,3,5,6,8, and 
9 also include a cubic in tenure , dummies for union membership and government employment. The sample selection criteria are 




















Control for occupation dummies
No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.123 0.154 0.155 0.180
N 747 747 747 747
Layoff
Notes: The vacation variables are the change in the number of paid vacation weeks (∆VP) and the change in the indicator 
1(VP > 0). All models include education, a cubic in experience, education * experience, dummies for sex, marital status, and 
health limitation, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, tenure (a cubic), dummies for union membership, government 
employment, and calendar years. The samples contain job changers who work 35 or more hours per week on the job in both 
current and previous interview years, were less than 60, had not retired, and were not self-employed. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.
Layoff × ∆VP
Layoff × ∆1(VP > 0)
Table 5







Quit × ∆1(VP > 0)OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.258 0.191 0.329 0.383 0.261 0.181 0.373 0.295
(0.019) (0.032) (0.042) (0.073) (0.041) (0.102) (0.108) (0.285)
0.615 0.446 0.755 0.797 0.615 0.438 0.834 0.692
(0.037) (0.069) (0.080) (0.151) (0.080) (0.221) (0.205) (0.595)
1.136 0.797 1.314 1.157 1.124 0.824 1.383 1.251
(0.048) (0.110) (0.097) (0.236) (0.103) (0.359) (0.250) (0.932)
1.996 1.306 2.062 1.313 1.971 1.407 1.932 2.104
(0.044) (0.180) (0.093) (0.411) (0.093) (0.584) (0.251) (1.579)
-0.088 -0.167 0.230 0.143 -0.006 -0.074 0.486 0.493
(0.040) (0.045) (0.084) (0.102) (0.086) (0.101) (0.209) (0.263)
-0.056 -0.178 0.250 0.117 -0.006 -0.094 0.504 0.518
(0.042) (0.053) (0.087) (0.119) (0.091) (0.108) (0.219) (0.286)
0.023 -0.163 0.226 0.065 -0.050 -0.180 0.030 0.051
(0.042) (0.063) (0.096) (0.131) (0.089) (0.123) (0.228) (0.273)
-0.076 -0.372 -0.024 -0.239 -0.198 -0.441 -0.875 -0.860
(0.076) (0.106) (0.192) (0.229) (0.157) (0.254) (0.440) (0.538)
Adjusted R
2 0.175 0.163 0.204 0.200 0.178 0.167 0.184 0.183
N 35522 35522 20089 20089 7697 7697 3055 3055
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.306 0.231 0.342 0.240 -0.045 -0.050 0.031 0.055
(0.025) (0.063) (0.059) (0.156) (0.045) (0.112) (0.118) (0.312)
0.712 0.561 0.754 0.543 -0.097 -0.123 0.081 0.149
(0.050) (0.136) (0.111) (0.325) (0.088) (0.242) (0.223) (0.651)
1.273 1.071 1.221 0.905 -0.149 -0.246 0.161 0.346
(0.064) (0.221) (0.136) (0.510) (0.113) (0.393) (0.273) (1.021)
2.129 1.982 1.697 1.149 -0.158 -0.575 0.235 0.954
(0.058) (0.361) (0.136) (0.863) (0.102) (0.640) (0.274) (1.728)
-0.055 -0.080 0.025 -0.041 0.049 0.005 0.461 0.533
(0.054) (0.063) (0.114) (0.144) (0.095) (0.111) (0.228) (0.288)
-0.056 -0.079 0.016 -0.069 0.050 -0.015 0.488 0.587
(0.056) (0.067) (0.119) (0.157) (0.099) (0.118) (0.239) (0.314)
0.033 0.022 -0.012 -0.083 -0.083 -0.202 0.043 0.135
(0.055) (0.076) (0.124) (0.149) (0.098) (0.135) (0.249) (0.299)
0.043 0.003 0.004 -0.101 -0.241 -0.444 -0.879 -0.760
(0.098) (0.157) (0.239) (0.294) (0.172) (0.278) (0.480) (0.589)
Adjusted R
2 0.306 0.305 0.127 0.118 0.022 0.011 0.082 0.077
N 7697 7697 3055 3055 7697 7697 3055 3055
Panel I Panel II
Panel III Panel IV
Weeks of Vacation Taken (VT)
Notes: All models control for education, a quartic in experience, education * experience, a cubic in seniority, dummies for sex, 
marital status, union membership, government employment, residence in SMSA, residence in city more than 500,000 people, 
and disability status, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. The IV results in columns 2 and 4 
treat both the time trend and the tenure variables as endogenous and are based on Altonji and Shakotko's (1987) 
methodology. The deviation of the tenure variables from their job means are used as instruments, along with the deviation of 
time from its mean for each individual. The sample selection criteria are described in the note to table 1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.
5 Years of Tenure
10 Years of Tenure
20 Years of Tenure
5 Years of Experience
10 Years of Experience
20 Years of Experience
30 Years of Experience
10 Years of Experience
20 Years of Experience
30 Years of Experience
2 Years of Tenure
10 Years of Tenure
20 Years of Tenure
5 Years of Experience






Table 6:  The Effects of Tenure and Experience on VT and VP, OLS and IV estimates
Weeks of Vacation Taken Minus Weeks 
of Paid Vacation (VT-VP)
Men Women
1975-1977, 1984
2 Years of Tenure
1975-1991
Weeks of Vacation Taken (VT)
5 Years of TenureTable 7: 
Source: Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1997 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, USDL 99-02. Data are from BLS Employee Benefits Survey
Source: Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1997 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, USDL 99-02. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ebs3.nws.htm, Table 4. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.216 0.094 0.076 0.282 0.150 0.086 0.291 0.176 0.224
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.072) (0.078) (0.075) (0.088) (0.090) (0.086)
0.647 0.627 1.427
(0.079) (0.086) (0.278)
Occupation Dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Adjusted R
2 0.113 0.158 0.158 0.131 0.195 0.189 0.114 0.175 0.181
N 1235 1235 1235 770 770 770 347 347 347
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.312 0.263 0.264 0.329 0.297 0.296 0.383 0.305 0.316
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.059) (0.055)
0.447 0.281 0.599
(0.107) (0.158) (0.204)
Occupation Dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Adjusted R
2 0.174 0.200 0.185 0.146 0.157 0.149 0.209 0.232 0.228
N 1287 1287 1287 776 776 776 350 350 350
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.682 0.668 0.629 0.700 0.689 0.649 0.653 0.654 0.595
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056)
0.453 0.413 0.478
(0.075) (0.095) (0.146)
Occupation Dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Adjusted R
2 0.667 0.695 0.677 0.685 0.717 0.694 0.648 0.692 0.661
N 1078 1078 1078 636 636 636 303 303 303
Notes: Two specifications are used to control for the occupation of the previous job. The first specification includes 27 occupation dummies, 
including a dummy for missing data on occupation. Occupation index is based on the coefficients on the occupation dummies in a cross 
section regression for vacation weeks taken (VT) on which are obtained from a cross sectional regression, as a variable to control for 
occupation. Sample sizes for the cross section regression are 51,835, 51,942 and 47,733 for vacation time, hours worked per week, and 
hourly rate of pay, respectively. All models control for education, experience (a cubic and an interaction between education and experience), 
seniority (cubic), and dummies for sex, marital status, union membership, government employment, residence in SMSA, residence in city 
more than 500,000 people, disability status, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. The sample selection criteria
are described in the note to table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
No No No No
Avg. of Log Wage in last 
two years
Occupation Index No No
Effects of Hourly Rate of Pay on Previous Job on Hourly Rate of Pay in New Job
All Job Changers Quits Layoffs
No No No No
Avg. of Hours/Week in last 
two years
Occupation Index No No
Effects of Hours Worked Per Week on Previous Job on Hours Worked Per Week in New Job
All Job Changers Quits Layoffs
No No No No
Avg. of Vacation Taken in 
last two years
Occupation Index No No
Table 8 
The Link Across Jobs in Vacation Weeks Taken, Hours Worked Per Week and Hourly Rate of Pay
Effects of Vacation on Previous Job on Vacation in New Job







Occupation Dummies No Yes No No Yes No
Adjusted R
2 0.221 0.330 0.257 0.316 0.373 0.334
N 302 302 302 158 158 158
No No No
Notes: Two specifications are used to control for the occupation of the previous job. The first specification includes 27 
occupation dummies, with missing occupation treated as a seperate category. The second specification (occupation 
index) uses coefficients on occupation dummies, which are obtained from a cross sectional regression (N=9,657), as 
a more parsimonious control for aspects of occupation of the previous job that are related to vacation.  All models 
control for education, a cubic in experience, education * experience), a cubic in seniority, dummies for sex, marital 
status, union membership, government employment, residence in SMSA, residence in city more than 500,000 
people, and disability status, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. The sample 
selection criteria are described in the note to table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Paid Vacation in last year




The Link between Vacation Weeks Paid Across Jobs
The Effect of Paid Vacation on Previous Job on Paid Vacation in New Job
Sample: All Job ChangersVariable Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Physician, Dentist 0.213 0.268 0.784 0.386 -0.148 0.669
Other Medical & Paramedical 0.423 0.101 0.994 0.160 -0.590 0.276
Accountant & Auditor -0.055 0.110 0.261 0.162 -0.047 0.281
Teacher K12 7.436 0.075 0.548 0.110 7.727 0.191
Teacher College, Librarian 2.613 0.113 0.255 0.182 2.574 0.315
Architects, Physical & Biological 0.014 0.079 0.245 0.111 -0.060 0.192
Technician 0.134 0.064 0.466 0.098 -0.325 0.170
Public Advisor -0.223 0.091 0.370 0.137 -0.461 0.237
Judge, Lawyer -0.485 0.171 0.565 0.290 -0.786 0.501
Other Professional 1.544 0.143 0.182 0.213 1.597 0.369
Manager, Official & Proprietor (not self) -0.059 0.050 0.273 0.073 -0.216 0.126
Manager, Official & Proprietor (self-emp) 0.639 0.631 -0.955 1.136 -0.211 1.967
Secretary, Typists -0.053 0.069 0.203 0.105 -0.348 0.182
Other Clerical Workers 0.146 0.047 0.314 0.066 -0.064 0.114
Retail Store Salesman & Sales Clerk -0.148 0.071 -0.150 0.101 0.133 0.175
Craftsmen, Foreman 0.093 0.082 0.356 0.109 -0.116 0.188
Other Craftsmen -0.145 0.045 -0.225 0.060 0.119 0.105
Government Protective Service Worker 0.087 0.097 0.319 0.139 -0.011 0.240
Armed Force 0.426 0.099 2.418 0.138 -1.865 0.239
Transport Equipment Operative -0.042 0.059 0.042 0.080 -0.005 0.138
Unskilled Laborer -0.374 0.064 -0.302 0.084 0.084 0.146
Farm Laborer & Foreman -0.417 0.130 -1.065 0.161 1.119 0.280
Private Household Worker -0.773 0.217 -1.131 0.293 -0.014 0.508
Other Service Worker -0.011 0.051 -0.078 0.071 0.243 0.123
Farmers & Manager 0.147 0.352 -0.882 0.509 1.401 0.882
Adjusted R
2
N 55182 10386 10386
Vacation Taken Paid Vacation Taken - Paid Vacation
Notes: The reference category for the occupational dummies is operatives, except transport. All models control for education, a 
cubic in experience, education * experience), a cubic in seniority, dummies for sex, marital status, union membership, 
government employment, residence in SMSA, residence in a city of more than 500,000 people, and disability status, 2 race 
dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. The sample selection criteria of the data are described in the note to 
table 1.
The Effects of Occupation on Vacation Weeks Taken, Vacation Weeks Paid, and Vacation Weeks Taken - 





Note: The sample contains individuals who work between 15 and 34 hours per week in their main 
job. The other restrictions are same as in the note to Figures 1, 2 and 3. That is, individuals were 
between age 19 to 59, had left school and not returned, had not retired, and were not self-
employed. It also restricts to persons who have at least .5 years of seniority at the time of the 
survey and exclude observations if the job ended prior to the next interview. 
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Weeks of Vacation Taken (VT)
Figure A3: Distribution of Vacation Weeks Taken - 
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WomenNotes: We use all the years available from the PSID. The sample design is the same as in the note to 
Figures 1, 2 and 3.
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WomenNote: The sample contains individuals who work between 15 and 34 hours per week in their main job. We 
use all the years available from the PSID. The sample selection criteria are the same as Figures 4, 5 and 6, 
except that we use years 1975-1991.
Figure A5: Distribution of Vacation Weeks Taken 





















Means of Selected Variables in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
Variable VP = 0 VP > 0 All VP = 0 VP > 0 All
Weeks of Vacation Taken (VT) 2.386 2.581 2.560 5.547 3.021 3.310
Weeks of Paid Vacation (VP) 0.000 2.818 2.516 0.000 2.765 2.450
Marital Status 0.846 0.888 0.884 0.542 0.494 0.499
Age 35.47 36.51 36.40 37.13 36.60 36.66
Education 11.14 12.22 12.10 12.52 12.29 12.32
Experience 16.48 17.59 17.48 14.24 14.58 14.54
Tenure 6.439 9.311 9.003 6.063 6.832 6.745
Wage 9.352 11.18 10.99 6.772 8.023 7.891
Government Employment 0.178 0.230 0.224 0.421 0.284 0.299
Union 0.248 0.344 0.334 0.092 0.160 0.152
Proportion Female  0.196 0.211 0.209 0.680 0.661 0.663
Teacher 0.071 0.014 0.020 0.258 0.045 0.069
Black 0.389 0.281 0.293 0.467 0.415 0.421
Nonblack/Nonwhite 0.046 0.023 0.025 0.017 0.016 0.016
Disability 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.069 0.064 0.064
SMSA 0.526 0.673 0.657 0.602 0.713 0.700
Large City 0.237 0.306 0.298 0.218 0.342 0.328
Northeast 0.104 0.169 0.162 0.103 0.161 0.154
North Central 0.201 0.266 0.259 0.183 0.221 0.217
West 0.149 0.153 0.153 0.095 0.157 0.150
South 0.545 0.410 0.425 0.616 0.459 0.477
Overemployment 0.027 0.047 0.045 0.032 0.044 0.043
Underemployment 0.374 0.263 0.275 0.209 0.162 0.167
Reasoning 3.202 3.478 3.448 3.555 3.467 3.477
Math 2.255 2.628 2.588 2.554 2.509 2.514
Language 2.588 2.898 2.865 3.149 3.029 3.043
SVP 4.788 5.273 5.222 5.032 4.904 4.918
Strength 1.843 1.363 1.415 1.144 0.934 0.957
Climbing 0.547 0.265 0.295 0.081 0.074 0.074
Balancing 0.361 0.161 0.183 0.073 0.055 0.057
Stooping 0.905 0.532 0.571 0.522 0.383 0.398
Kneeling 0.643 0.286 0.324 0.186 0.137 0.143
Crouching 0.727 0.361 0.400 0.193 0.195 0.195
Crawling 0.118 0.058 0.065 0.011 0.012 0.012
Reaching 1.929 1.910 1.912 1.780 1.911 1.896
Handling 1.946 1.926 1.929 1.812 1.933 1.919
Fingering 1.315 1.425 1.414 1.442 1.606 1.587
Feeling 0.145 0.141 0.141 0.200 0.181 0.183
Talking 0.818 0.970 0.954 1.528 1.289 1.316
Hearing 0.956 1.045 1.035 1.579 1.338 1.365
Weather 1.055 0.496 0.556 0.128 0.114 0.116
Wet/humid 0.128 0.101 0.104 0.101 0.109 0.108
Noise 3.485 3.304 3.323 3.040 2.962 2.971
Atmospheric condition 0.435 0.182 0.209 0.038 0.045 0.044
Vibration 0.026 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.002
Appendix Table A1 contd.
Means of Selected Variables in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
Variable VP = 0 VP > 0 All VP = 0 VP > 0 All
Weeks of Paid Vacation (VP) 0.000 3.669 3.259 0.000 3.560 3.114
Marital Status 0.828 0.884 0.878 0.768 0.734 0.738
Age 55.05 55.31 55.28 53.51 53.31 53.34
Education 11.87 12.88 12.77 12.98 13.00 13.00
Experience 34.42 35.66 35.52 26.60 28.77 28.50
Tenure 9.828 16.13 15.43 10.16 12.46 12.17
Wage 10.54 12.03 11.86 8.465 9.858 9.688
Hours/Week 46.02 45.71 45.75 43.32 41.98 42.15
Weeks Worked (counting VP) 45.99 51.53 50.92 43.93 51.10 50.22
Paid Sick Days 1.931 9.610 8.475 4.475 9.848 9.031
Days Missed due to Illness 0.636 0.971 0.934 0.657 1.074 1.021
Government Employment 0.011 0.073 0.066 0.027 0.072 0.066
Union 0.285 0.319 0.315 0.259 0.218 0.223
Black 0.125 0.124 0.124 0.149 0.190 0.185
Nonblack/Nonwhite 0.053 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.039 0.040
Health Limitation 0.092 0.073 0.075 0.087 0.065 0.068
Northeast 0.144 0.167 0.165 0.114 0.180 0.172
Midwest 0.230 0.257 0.254 0.238 0.240 0.240
West 0.170 0.160 0.161 0.162 0.141 0.143
South 0.455 0.415 0.420 0.485 0.440 0.445
Overemployment 0.091 0.134 0.129 0.081 0.190 0.176
Underemployment 0.162 0.138 0.141 0.157 0.129 0.132
Values of VP
Values of VP
Note: The numbers in the table are means of the row variables conditional on column segments on VP. These are 
calculated across individuals between 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. The sample selection criteria are described 
Women Men
Note: The numbers in the table are means of the row variables conditional on column segments on VP. These are 
calculated across individuals between 1975-1991. The sample selection criteria are described in the note to table 1.





























0 2.39 44.88 46.30 23.98 2128.24 143.37 2190.50
1 1.38 48.39 44.47 48.43 2135.32 54.50 2262.96
2 1.94 48.26 44.43 42.58 2173.64 63.40 2259.88
3 2.77 47.55 43.92 54.63 2135.70 58.90 2205.63
4 3.44 47.08 44.27 47.17 2065.48 87.33 2199.50
5 4.48 46.09 44.05 55.05 2075.55 39.36 2144.56
6 3.89 46.90 47.17 39.36 2324.01 83.37 2354.32
7+ 8.20 41.05 46.99 49.14 1852.62 158.05 2104.56
Total 2.56 47.37 44.58 45.36 2135.06 74.25 2226.99





























0 5.55 42.48 40.42 25.56 1703.62 47.76 1781.08
1 2.08 47.08 40.61 24.45 1898.92 39.65 1953.05
2 2.41 47.22 40.54 30.72 1937.41 22.88 1961.63
3 3.35 46.33 40.31 25.41 1890.47 29.96 1915.13
4 3.66 46.04 40.89 31.93 1904.24 41.39 1941.70
5 3.78 46.16 40.77 26.25 1881.83 28.83 1959.43
6 4.31 45.69 42.13 26.52 1990.32 70.00 1998.92
7+ 10.64 40.16 42.29 31.68 1794.37 61.37 1740.30
Total 3.31 46.14 40.59 28.06 1888.57 33.50 1923.53
Notes: The numbers in the table are means of the column variable conditional on the row value of weeks of paid 
vacation. The number of observations for men (women) are 7,697 (3,055) for vacation weeks taken, 7,702 (3,059) for 
weeks worked on main job, 7,708 (3,061) for hours per week on main job and hours worked on all jobs, 2,093 (1,407) 
for overtime hours, annual hours worked on main job, and annual hours worked on extra jobs. We have fewer 
observations for columns 4-6 because only observations from year 1984 are available. 
Appendix Table A2
Means of Vacation Weeks Taken, Weeks Worked on Main Job, Hours/week on Main Job, Annual 
Hours Worked on Extra Jobs, and Annual Hours Worked on All Jobs by Weeks of Paid Vacation
Men
WomenMen and Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.101 0.064 0.110 0.062 0.075 0.048
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.189 -0.094 -0.154 -0.061 -0.171 -0.070















Controls for tenure, 
union and 
government
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.445 0.467 0.477 0.384 0.428 0.431 0.382 0.401 0.425
N 15454 15454 15454 8393 8393 8393 7061 7061 7061
Notes: The table reports OLS regression coefficients relating log hourly wage rate to measures of weeks of paid vacation. In 
columns 1,2,4,5,7, and 8 the vacation variables are the number of weeks (VP and and indicator for VP > 0. Columns 3, 6, and 
9 contain dummy variables for each number of weeks of paid vacation with VP=2 as the reference category. All models include 
education, experience (a cubic and an interaction between education and experience), dummies for sex, marital status, and 
health limitation, 2 race dummies, 3 regional dummies, and calendar year dummies. Column 2,3,5,6,8, and 9 also tenure (a 
cubic), dummies for union membership and government employment. The sample contains individuals who work 35 or more 











The Effect of Weeks of Paid Vacation on the log of the Hourly Wage: HRS
Sample
Hourly and Salary Hourly Only Salary Only